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Abstract 
In this paper we estimate the effect of particular price incentives on consumer 
payment patterns using transaction-level data. We find that participation in a 
loyalty program and access to an interest-free period, both of which lower the price 
of credit card use, tend to increase credit card use at the expense of alternative 
payment methods, such as debit cards and cash. Specifically, we find that a loyalty 
program increases the probability of credit card use by 23 percentage points and 
access to the interest-free period increases the probability by 16 percentage points. 
Interestingly, the pattern of substitution from cash and debit cards is different in 
each of these cases. A loyalty program reduces the probability of cash use by 
14 percentage points and has little effect on debit card use, while access to the 
interest-free period has little effect on cash use but reduces the probability of debit 
card use by 19  percentage points. We find these effects to be economically 
significant and large enough that they can help to explain observed aggregate 
payments patterns. An implication is that the Reserve Bank reforms of the 
Australian payments system are likely to have influenced observed payment 
patterns. 
JEL Classification Numbers: C35, D12, G20 
Keywords: consumer choice, retail payment systems, price incentives, 
loyalty programs ii 
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1.  Introduction 
Over the past decade, payment patterns in Australia have changed substantially. In 
line with most other countries, electronic means of payment, such as credit cards 
and debit cards, have grown strongly, while the number of personal cheques 
written per person has declined significantly (Figure 1). Among electronic payment 
methods, however, there have been some interesting trends and trend reversals. For 
example, credit cards enjoyed remarkable rates of growth in the late 1990s, 
eventually overtaking debit cards as the most common form of non-cash payment. 
Subsequently, their rate of growth has tailed off and, more recently, there has been 
a switch back towards debit cards as the most common form of non-cash payment. 
These changes in payment method use over a period of substantial reform provide 
prima facie evidence that a relationship exists between price incentives and the use 
of particular payment methods. The aggregate data, however, are not sufficient to 
make more than tentative conclusions about this relationship. Data on the 
payments behaviour of individuals offer the prospect of obtaining a more nuanced 
and accurate view of the influences on payment patterns. 
As part of its review of its card payment reforms, the Reserve Bank of Australia 
collected detailed data on the transaction behaviour of a broadly representative 
sample of 662 Australians over a two-week period in 2007. These data provide the 
first comprehensive transaction-level study in Australia of payment methods used 
by individuals, including, importantly, cash. In this paper, the data collected from 
this study are used to estimate econometric models of the holding of credit cards, 
and the use of credit cards, debit cards and cash. Similar to Bounie and 
François  (2006), our dataset allows us to not only control for demographic 
influences, but also for transaction-related characteristics, such as merchant type 
and transaction value. Further, of particular interest to this study, our dataset allows 
us to identify price incentives for credit cards: whether the consumer participates in  
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Note:  Debit and credit card data prior to 2002 have been adjusted for a break in the series due to an expansion 
of the retail payments statistics in 2002. 
Sources:   ABS; APCA; BPAY; RBA 
a loyalty program and whether the consumer typically obtains the benefit of the  
interest-free period. 
We use these data to examine a number of aspects of consumer payments. In 
particular, we consider what effect loyalty programs have on the choice of payment 
instruments and examine the patterns of substitution between credit cards, debit 
cards and cash as a result of these programs. We conduct similar analysis on the 
effect of access to an interest-free period. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide a 
brief overview of the aggregate trends in the Australian payments system over the 
past decade, as well as some background on the Reserve Bank’s reforms. Section 3 
examines previous studies related to our paper. Section 4 discusses the data we use 
and sketches some features of the data. Section 5 outlines the modelling framework 
and discusses the results, particularly in relation to price incentives. Section 6 
concludes. 
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2.  The Australian Payments Landscape 
The main payment instruments available to Australian consumers are similar to 
those in other industrialised countries.1 One unusual feature of Australian payment 
patterns until quite recently, however, has been the strong growth in credit card 
use, relative to debit card use (Figure 2).2 
Figure 2: Card Payments per Capita 































































































Notes:   Incorporates estimate of 2006 credit card use in Japan. ‘CPSS average’ refers to member countries of the 
Bank for International Settlements Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems. 
Sources:   ABS; APCA; BIS; RBA 
One factor that is likely to have contributed to this trend in Australia was the 
pricing structure of the credit card and domestic debit card (EFTPOS) systems 
                                           
1  Further details on these payment instruments and their uses can be found in Emery, West and 
Massey (2008). 
2  Unless otherwise separately identified, in this paper credit cards include credit/charge cards 
from the MasterCard, Visa, American Express and Diners Club schemes, and debit cards 
include cards from the domestic EFTPOS system and the MasterCard and Visa debit schemes. 
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which differs somewhat from many other countries. For many Australian 
consumers, the effective price of using a credit card to make payments was less 
than that of using EFTPOS.3 For example, at the time of the Reserve Bank’s initial 
investigation of credit and debit card systems in 2000, an EFTPOS transaction 
often incurred a cost of around $0.50 once a certain number of fee-free transactions 
had been made each month. In contrast, some consumers were effectively paid to 
use their credit card via the interest-free period and loyalty program rewards. These 
loyalty program rewards were quite generous; an average expenditure of around 
$12 400 earnt a $100 shopping voucher in June 2003.4 Hence, combined with an 
interest-free period (typically up to 55 days), the effective price for a $100 credit 
card transaction for a transactor with a loyalty program, prior to the reforms, was 
around –$1.30.5,6 Average annual fees, which can also have some influence on a 
consumer’s choice of holding and, hence, use of a particular payment instrument, 
were $61 on a standard rewards card and $98 on a gold rewards card in 
June 2002.7  
One important factor affecting the pricing of these two systems is interchange 
fees – the fees paid between the merchant’s and cardholder’s financial institutions 
(the issuers) each time a transaction is made. In Australia, the average interchange 
fee in the credit card system has been, and continues to be, substantially higher 
than the interchange fee in the EFTPOS system. Prior to the reforms, the average 
interchange fee in the MasterCard and Visa credit card schemes was around 
0.95 per cent of the transaction value (paid to the issuer). Similar interchange fees 
also applied for the Visa Debit system (the only scheme debit system then in 
                                           
3  RBA and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2000). 
4  See RBA (2008b) for further details of reward program benefits to cardholders. These are the 
earliest data available and are sourced from bank websites for the following cards: ANZ 
Telstra Rewards Visa card; Commonwealth Bank MasterCard Awards card; National 
Australia Bank Visa Gold card; and Westpac Altitude MasterCard. 
5  RBA (2008c). The effective, or marginal, price takes into account the interest-free period and 
the value of loyalty program rewards. The annual fee is not accounted for in this calculation. 
6  A transactor is a credit card holder who pays their bill in full each month and, thus, has access 
to an interest-free period. In contrast, a revolver is a credit card holder who uses the credit 
facility of a credit card and incurs an interest charge for each transaction made on the credit 
card. Revolvers likely faced a positive price for using their credit card because of interest 
charges. 
7  Averages for credit cards with an interest-free period issued by major banks. RBA (2008a) 
provides additional detail. 
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operation).8 In contrast to most other countries, in Australia the interchange fee in 
the EFTPOS system flows in the opposite direction – from the cardholder’s 
financial institution to the merchant’s financial institution – and was around 
$0.20 per transaction prior to the reforms. Not surprisingly, this structure of fees 
provided little incentive for issuers to promote or price the domestic EFTPOS 
system attractively to cardholders.  
The Reserve Bank was concerned that the relative levels of interchange fees 
between credit and debit cards was not contributing to an efficient payments 
system. Some particular concerns were that the relative prices to cardholders for 
card payments did not generally reflect relative costs and interchange fees were not 
subject to the normal forces of competition. In addition, price signals to 
cardholders were distorted by credit card schemes imposing rules that did not 
allow merchants to surcharge at the point of sale. Hence, based on its legislative 
mandate to promote efficiency and competition in the payments system, the 
Reserve Bank’s Payments System Board introduced a number of reforms to debit 
and credit card arrangements, beginning from the start of 2003. These included 
setting interchange fee benchmarks for the credit card, debit card and EFTPOS 
systems, and removing scheme rules that prevented merchants from surcharging.9 
Figure 3 shows the extent to which the reforms have lowered interchange fees in 
the respective systems, as well as narrowed the difference in fees between the 
systems. 
These reforms have contributed to changes in effective prices facing card users. 
For credit cards, the reforms have had a number of effects, including: a reduction 
in the generosity of loyalty program rewards, with an average spend of $16 700 
now required to obtain a $100 shopping voucher compared with $12 400 in 2003; 
an increase in average annual fees of around 40 per cent to be currently $85 for a 
standard rewards card and $140 for a gold rewards card; and a gradual increase in 
the prevalence of surcharging at the point of sale.10 In addition, the reforms have 
also contributed to changes in the types of credit card products offered. With 
issuers receiving lower interchange-fee revenue, competition has partly focused on 
interest rates, rather than reward programs, and has led to a proliferation in the 
                                           
8  MasterCard’s debit product was not launched in Australia until November 2005. 
9  See RBA (2008c) for a detailed discussion of the reforms. 
10 RBA (2008b) and RBA (2009). 
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number of low-rate cards. These low-rate cards generally do not offer reward 
points but have both an interest-free period and lower annual fees than do the 
higher interest rate cards. For the EFTPOS system, the opposite has occurred, with 
most financial institutions now offering unlimited fee-free transactions for a small 
fixed monthly account-keeping fee.  
Figure 3: Interchange Fees on a $100 Payment 
Excluding GST 











Note:  The post-reform data show the benchmark for each system. 
Source:   RBA 
Figure 4 shows growth in credit and debit card payments during this period of 
significant payments system change. Although some slowing in credit card 
payment growth was inevitable from the rapid pace experienced over the late 
1990s, what is interesting is that there appears to have been a shift in the relative 
growth in the two card payment instruments. Further, this shift appears to have 
coincided with the shift in relative prices resulting from the reforms. This issue is 
explored in further detail later in the paper, using transaction-level data.  
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Source:   RBA 
3.  Consumer Payments Literature 
The academic literature on consumers’ use of payment methods remains relatively 
scant, although this field of payments research has grown considerably in recent 
times. Earlier literature in this area focused on the influence of demographic 
variables and payment instrument attributes on consumers’ choice of payment 
instrument; see Stavins (2001) and Klee (2006), for example. More recent papers, 
such as by Borzekowski, Kiser and Ahmed (2008), Ching and Hayashi (2008) and 
Zinman  (2008), build upon this earlier literature to incorporate price-related 
variables into econometric modelling. Humphrey, Kim and Vale (2001) use 
aggregate transaction and price data for Norway to estimate own-price, cross-price 
and substitution elasticities for cash, debit cards and cheques. They conclude that 
consumers are quite sensitive to explicit pricing for payment services and also find 
that debit cards are quite a strong substitute for cheques. 
The approach taken in this paper is similar to the approach in 
Borzekowski et al (2008), which estimates a series of probit models of debit card 
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holding and use. That paper used 2004 data from a special component of the 
Reuters/University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers. A nationally representative 
sample of around 1  500 households were asked about their use of PIN and 
signature debit cards, and open-ended questions to elicit information on the 
underlying reasons households choose to use debit cards (for example, security and 
convenience attributes). In addition to demographic variables, data on fees some 
banks charged cardholders for PIN debit transactions were also incorporated into 
probit models of debit card use. The results of these models indicate that the 
imposition of fees for PIN debit transactions encourages households to use 
signature debit cards instead of PIN debit cards but reduces the overall likelihood 
of households using debit cards. In fact, the paper finds that a transaction fee of 
less than 2 per cent of the average transaction amount is associated with a 
12 per cent reduction in the likelihood of using a debit card. The authors note that 
the price response to merchant surcharging is likely to be larger than this, given 
that transaction fees are generally not disclosed to the consumer at the point of 
sale. 
Ching and Hayashi (2008) estimate a series of multinominal logit models to 
analyse the effects of demographic variables (including individuals’ adoption of 
technology), payment method attributes (including convenience and security) and 
loyalty program rewards on consumers’ choice of payment methods at the point of 
sale. The paper uses data from the 2005/2006 Study of Consumer Payment 
Preferences, conducted by the American Bankers Association and Dove 
Consulting. Around 3 000 consumers completed the questionnaire, mainly via the 
internet. While not a nationally representative survey, it provides a richer source of 
payments information (for example, data on consumers’ credit card loyalty 
program participation) than can be obtained from sources such as the Federal 
Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances. The questionnaire asked consumers 
about their most frequently used payment method across five merchant categories. 
Ching and Hayashi run a hypothetical experiment of abolishing loyalty program 
rewards and conclude that only a small percentage of consumers would switch 
from electronic to paper-based payment methods, while consumers would increase 
their use of debit cards and decrease the use of credit cards. Their paper also finds 
that those consumers who normally incur an interest charge on their credit card 
balance are far less likely to make payments with a credit card. Zinman (2008) also 
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estimates probit models of the use of payment instruments and finds that revolvers 
are at least 21 per cent more likely to use debit cards than transactors, based on 
1995 to 2004 data from the Survey of Consumer Finances. Zinman’s results 
suggest that debit cards are a close substitute for credit cards, cash and cheques. 
This paper builds on the existing literature that examines the influence of price-
related variables on the use of payment instruments. It takes advantage of a unique 
transaction-level database that provides rich data not typically available in the 
questionnaire-style approach underpinning much of the existing literature. In this 
regard, our dataset is most similar to that used in Bounie and François (2006); a 
paper that estimates a multinominal logit model of cash, cheque and payment card 
use incorporating demographic and transaction explanatory variables (for example, 
transaction amount and merchant type). Our paper extends this type of work by 
incorporating price-related variables such as loyalty program participation and 
consumers’ transactor/revolver status. The dataset used in Bounie and 
François (2006) consisted of transaction-level data on 17 000 payments made by 
around 1 400 French adults over an eight-day period in 2005, captured through a 
payments diary. Consumers were asked to record the details of the payments they 
made – the amount, merchant type, type of good, any payment restrictions faced, 
and the channel used (for example, face-to-face, internet or telephone). The paper 
discusses the importance of factors such as the transaction amount and merchant 
environment in determining the payment instrument used; for example, they find 
that controlling for other factors, the probability of cash use declines as the 
transaction value increases. 
4.  Data and Summary Statistics 
4.1  The Data 
The transaction-level data used in this paper were obtained from a survey of how 
consumers pay for goods and services, commissioned by the Reserve Bank in 2007 
as part of its review of payments system reforms (RBA 2008c). The Reserve Bank 
employed a private research company, Roy Morgan Research, to help design and 
conduct the survey, which involved individuals recording the details of every 
purchase and bill payment they made over a two-week period in a specially 
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designed pocket-sized diary. For each payment, participants were asked to record 
information on the payment instrument, the value of the transaction, the merchant 
category, the channel (for example, point of sale, internet, telephone or mail) and 
mark a check-box if they were charged a fee by a merchant (or billing 
organisation) for using the particular payment instrument chosen (a ‘surcharge’).11  
Roy Morgan Research selected a nationally representative sample of 1  000 
individuals, aged over 18 years, from its database to participate in the survey. 
Participants were asked to complete the survey over a two-week period in early 
June 2007. Completed diaries were received from 677 people. Fifteen individuals 
were excluded owing to inconsistencies in responses, resulting in a final sample of 
662 individuals.12  
Demographic information on each respondent was provided by Roy Morgan 
Research, including information on the individual’s age, gender, regional location, 
educational level, income, and credit card holding status (that is, whether they hold 
a credit card, and if they do, whether they usually pay their bill in full each month). 
Furthermore, information was available on whether or not the cardholder held at 
least one credit card with a loyalty program attached to it.  
The diary captured data on the use of 9 different payment instruments in 17 
different merchant categories and generated a sample of almost 17 000 payments 
for a total value of around A$850 000. In addition, the diary captured data on the 
use of 4 methods of obtaining cash and generated a sample of around 1 800 cash 
withdrawals for a total value of around A$320 000. Table 1 presents a selection of 
                                           
11 Participants were also asked to record details in the diary of every cash withdrawal they made 
during the survey period, including the method used to withdraw the cash and the amount of 
cash obtained. In addition to completing the diary, participants were asked to complete a 
one-page questionnaire on their personal use of automated debits and surcharging experience 
at the end of the two-week period. This questionnaire was returned by 587 individuals. 
12 While the sample was designed to be representative of the Australian adult population, the 
response rates were such that ultimately some demographic groups (for example, older 
people) were over-represented in the final sample. Accordingly, Roy Morgan Research 
applied weightings to ensure that the final data were more representative of the population as 
a whole. These weighted data are used in the descriptive analysis in this section. However, the 
estimation of the econometric models uses unweighted data, since it is not clear whether the 
weights, which were derived to ensure representativeness of the total population in a few 
demographic dimensions, would be appropriate for our specific econometric model. 
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sample statistics and Appendix A contains more detailed information on the fields 
contained in the diary survey. 
Table 1: Sample Statistics 
Proportion of respondents, per cent 
Age (years)    Education level   
18–29   22    (10)  Under grade 10    14  (15) 
30–44   28    (26) Grade  10/11    17  (19) 
45–59   26    (32) Grade  12    10  (8) 
60+   24    (32) Technical  qualification    26  (25) 
   University  degree    33  (32) 
Personal income (pa)    Loyalty program
(a)   
<$20 000    39   (40) Loyalty  program    69  (69) 
$20 000–$39 999    28   (27)  No loyalty program    31  (31) 
$40 000–$59 999    16   (15)    
$60 000–$79 999    9   (8)    
$80 000–$99 999    5   (5)    
$100 000–$119 999    2   (2)    
$120 000+    2   (3)    
Gender    Location  
Male   49    (42) Capital  city    62  (57) 
Female   51    (58) Regional    38  (43) 
Credit card holding    Transactor/revolver status
(a)   
Credit card    50   (61) Transactor    66  (67) 
No credit card    50   (39) Revolver    34  (33) 
Notes:  Roy Morgan Research applied weightings for age, gender, location and credit card holding status. The 
unweighted shares for these variables are in brackets. The weighted and unweighted shares sum to 100 
except for some rounding issues.  
(a) Proportion of credit card holders. 
Sources:  Roy Morgan Research; RBA 
4.2  Summary Statistics  
4.2.1  Influence of transaction characteristics  
Despite strong growth in the use of non-cash payment methods in recent years, 
cash is still by far the most commonly used payment instrument in Australia, 
accounting for around 70 per cent of the number of consumer payments and 
38 per cent of their value (Table 2). Nevertheless, the diary results suggest that the 
choice of payment instruments by the consumer is closely related to the transaction 
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amount. Cash is the most commonly used payment instrument for low-value 
transactions, accounting for nearly all transactions under $10 and three-quarters of 
transactions between $11 and $25 (Table 3). Conversely, cheques and BPAY are 
used relatively more for higher-value consumer payments, together accounting for 
29 per cent of the payments above $500. Cards are used extensively across all but 
very low transaction values. For transactions between $25 and $200, debit and 
credit cards account for 45 per cent of transactions.  
Table 2: Payment Methods
(a)
 
  Per cent of number  Per cent of value 
Cash 70  38 
EFTPOS 11  14 
MasterCard/Visa debit card  4  6 
MasterCard/Visa credit card  9  17 
American Express/Diners Club card  1  2 
Petrol/store card  *  * 
Cheque 1  9 
BPAY 2  9 
Other
(b)  1 3 
Notes:  (a)  Amounts less than 0.5 per cent are marked with an asterisk. 
  (b) ‘Other’ payment methods include instruments such as money orders and Cabcharge payments. 
Source:   Roy Morgan Research 
 
Consumers’ use of payment instruments also appears to be related to the merchant 
environment. Cash is used extensively in many merchant categories, for example 
in take-away food stores and pubs, but less so for travel and insurance purchases 
(Table 3). Likewise, the share of payments made by debit cards is largest at petrol 
stations and supermarkets and credit cards’ share of payments is largest for travel 
and insurance payments.  
These differences across merchant categories are likely to reflect a number of 
factors. For example, consumers’ desire for quick transaction times for certain 
purchases like take-away food may lead to high use of cash in these situations. Use 
of debit cards in petrol stations and supermarkets is likely to reflect, in part, the 
availability of EFTPOS cash-out facilities. Differences across merchant categories 
may also reflect different average transaction values and restrictions such as which 
instruments or channels are available to consumers. For example, the share of 
payments made by cash is much lower for travel and insurance purchases and this 
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may partly reflect a ‘channel’ effect as consumers deal with these types of 
businesses via the internet relatively more than other businesses. 
Table 3: Payment Method Use 
Share of the number of payments, per cent (continued next page) 




Cheque BPAY  Other   
methods 
Transaction value ($)            
0–10 95  3  1  0  0  0 
11–25 74  16  8  0  1  1 
26–50 56  23  17  1  2  2 
51–75 39  29  24  2  3  3 
76–100 37  28  21  3  9  2 
101–150 34  29  22  4  6  3 
151–200 31  28  24  3  11  3 
201–500 31  21  21  7  15  5 
500+ 19  18  30  15  14  5 
Merchant category             
Take-away 94  5  1  0  0  0 
Pub/bar 90  6  3  0  0  0 
Small food store  89  7  4  0  0  0 
Sporting/entertainment 86  6  5  1  0  1 
Transport 83  7  6  1  2  0 
Restaurant 78  9  12  0  0  0 
Other 69  9  7  5  6  4 
Education/childcare 67  13  5  9  2  4 
Liquor store  65  19  15  0  0  0 
Retailer 64  19  15  1  1  2 
Supermarket 62  25  12  0  0  0 
Health/medical 57  19  20  3  1  1 
Professional services  52  13  17  13  2  3 
Petrol 48  32  17  0  0  4 
Housing/utilities 39  12  13  5  28  3 
Holiday/travel 27  20  42  6  2  2 
Insurance 26  13  23  6  18  14 
Age (years)             
18–29 69  19  8  0  3  1 
30–44 65  19  11  1  3  1 
45–59 70  14  11  2  2  2 
60+ 79  8  9  2  1  1 
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Table 3: Payment Method Use 
Share of the number of payments, per cent (continued) 




Cheque BPAY  Other   
methods 
Personal income (pa)             
<$20 000   76  13  8  1  1  1 
$20 000–$39 999   70  18  7  1  3  1 
$40 000–$59 999  64  18  13  1  3  2 
$60 000–$79 999  65  16  15  1  2  2 
$80 000–$99 999  67  12  18  1  1  2 
$100 000–$119 999  69  6  21  1  3  0 
$120 000+   65  10  19  2  2  3 
Transactor/revolver status             
Transactor 64  10  22  1  1  1 
Revolver 62  19  12  1  4  2 
No credit card  79  17  Na  1  2  1 
Credit card holders             
Loyalty program  61  12  23  1  2  1 
No loyalty program  66  16  11  1  3  2 
Notes:  Payment methods’ shares sum across categories; in some cases the sum does not equal 100 due to
rounding. These shares reflect weights applied by Roy Morgan Research for age, gender, location and
credit card holding status. This table excludes payments where the cardholder did not provide information
on key variables. For instance, payments where a cardholder did not report a payment method or
transaction amount were excluded. 
Source:  Roy Morgan Research 
 
4.2.2  Influence of demographics 
Age appears to play some role in determining consumers’ use of payment 
instruments. While cash is used extensively across all age groups, older individuals 
appear to use cash more than younger people (Table 3). People over 60 years of 
age use cash for almost 80 per cent of their payments, compared to around 65 per 
cent for those aged between 30 and 44 years. 
The use of debit cards is highest in the younger age groups and declines for older 
age groups. Conversely, the use of credit cards is relatively low for the youngest 
age group, reflecting the fact that younger people are not as likely to hold credit 
cards. Around one-third of respondents aged 18–29 years in our sample held a 
credit card; this compares to around half for the adult population.  
The use of cards also appears to be influenced by an individual’s personal income. 
Credit cards are used relatively more at higher income levels, while debit card use 
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is highest for middle income bands. Those with a personal income of more than 
$100 000 used credit cards for around 20 per cent of their total payments, more 
than twice the share of those earning under $40 000. However, it is difficult to 
separate the influence of higher credit card holding among high-income individuals 
from higher use of credit cards as income increases. In Section 5, we examine the 
effect of income on credit card use, conditional on holding a credit card. 
4.2.3  Influence of price incentives  
In addition to the influence of transaction and demographic characteristics 
described above, credit card holders’ use of payment instruments also appears to be 
influenced by the relative price of payment instruments. In particular, credit card 
holders’ transactor/revolver status appears to be important. 
According to the diary survey, transactors use credit cards relatively more often 
than revolvers – for around 22 per cent of their transactions compared to 
12 per cent for revolvers, and 35 per cent of the value of spending compared to 
22 per cent for revolvers. Conversely, revolvers tend to use debit cards more often 
than transactors (Table 3). In part, this pattern is likely to reflect the fact that for 
revolvers an additional purchase on their credit card accrues an interest charge 
immediately, increasing the relative price of credit cards compared to other 
payment methods. 
Loyalty programs are another important factor affecting the relative price of 
payment instruments. According to data from Roy Morgan’s Single Source 
database, almost 70 per cent of Australian credit card holders aged over 18 years 
have a loyalty program attached to at least one of their credit cards. Loyalty 
program participation appears to be more common for transactors, with three-
quarters of transactors participating in loyalty programs compared to 59 per cent of 
revolvers. On average, credit card holders with loyalty programs use their credit 
cards around twice as often as those who do not participate in a loyalty program 
(Table 3). 
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4.2.4  Merchant surcharging  
Participants in the diary study were asked to record each transaction they made 
where they paid a surcharge. However, instances where the merchant applied a 
surcharge for a particular payment method but where the consumer chose to use an 
alternative payment method are not observed. Consequently, the sample size for 
the number of credit card transactions attracting a surcharge is small, limiting its 
usefulness. Further, obtaining information on the range of choices and limitations 
the consumers faced when making their decisions is difficult because often it is not 
readily available to the consumer at the point of sale and it can add a significant 
reporting burden, reducing the likelihood that consumers will participate in the 
survey. For example, if anything, the presence of surcharging is likely to be higher 
than suggested by our survey results, because we do not directly survey whether 
the merchant applied a surcharge or not, we only observe if the consumer paid the 
surcharge. Given these limitations of the data, it is not possible to incorporate the 
surcharging variable into the econometric models used below. In addition, Roy 
Morgan Research noted that some respondents may have incorrectly understood 
the instructions on surcharging, as a number of respondents reported being 
surcharged for the use of cash.  
Notwithstanding these limitations, there are a number of interesting findings that 
can be made using the data available. Cardholders reported paying a surcharge for 
around 5 per cent of credit card transactions. Of those respondents who filled in the 
automated debits and surcharging questionnaire, and reported facing a credit card 
surcharge at least once over the two-week period, 44 per cent reported that it 
affected their choice of payment instrument ‘very much’ or ‘somewhat’, while 
52 per cent thought it affected their choice ‘very little’ or ‘not at all’.  
Credit card holders appear to be more likely to pay a surcharge the higher the 
transaction amount, with a noticeable increase in the share of transactions that 
attracted a surcharge for amounts above $150 (Figure 5). Only around 1–2 per cent 
of department store and supermarket credit card transactions were reported as 
attracting a surcharge compared to around 29 per cent of holiday/travel credit card 
purchases and 18 per cent of sporting/entertainment purchases. This difference 
across merchant categories could partly reflect the influence of the payment 
channel. For example, it was reported that 16 per cent of credit card payments 
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made over the internet attracted a surcharge, compared to 4 per cent of those made 
in-person. In addition, people who participate in a loyalty program paid surcharges 
for credit card transactions at about twice the rate of people without a loyalty 
program (5.7 per cent versus 2.9 per cent of credit card payments made). Given 
these interesting statistics, we hope to make greater use of these surcharging data 
in later work.  
Figure 5:  Proportion of Credit Card Purchases Attracting Surcharges 
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Source:   Roy Morgan Research 
5.  Modelling Consumer Payment Behaviour for Australia 
In this section, we present the results of an econometric model for the holding and 
use of various payment instruments: credit cards; debit cards; and cash. As 
discussed in Section 4, there are three sets of factors that are potentially important 
determinants of whether a consumer uses a particular payment instrument: 
demographic factors; transaction characteristics; and our variables of interest – 
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loyalty program participation and the interest-free period.13 We are especially 
interested in how these price incentives affect the probability of using different 
payment instruments. Our dataset, compared with those used in most previous 
studies, is especially useful for this purpose because it records actual payment 
instrument use, as opposed to assumed most frequent use.  
5.1  Modelling Framework 
5.1.1  Credit card holding 
In Australia, for the vast majority of everyday transactions, consumers will 
generally be able to pay with a credit card, debit card or cash. However, while cash 
and debit cards are held by almost all consumers, many do not have a credit card.14 
Hence, we first examine the main factors determining the probability of a 
consumer holding a credit card.  
For our dependent variable, we only know the outcome of whether the consumer 
holds a credit card or not, rather than the utility derived from holding a credit card. 
Therefore, a latent variable approach is used. The dependent variable, CChold, is 
defined as 1 if the consumer holds a credit card and 0 otherwise and CChold* is 
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 (1) 
                                           
13  Loyalty program participation and interest-free period are captured by dummy variables. 
Loyalty program participation is defined as: 1 if consumer does not have a loyalty program 
and 0 otherwise. The interest-free period is defined as: 1 if the consumer does not have an 
interest-free period (is a revolver) and 0 otherwise (is a transactor). Owing to data limitations, 
there may be some transactors in the sample whose card does not have an interest-free period. 
This problem is likely to be relatively small, however, as at the aggregate level only 6 per cent 
of personal credit card accounts do not have an interest-free period, and revolvers are 
probably more likely than transactors to choose to hold these cards since they do not usually 
receive the benefit of any interest-free period. 
14 In Australia, an EFTPOS card is typically issued with the opening of a transaction account; 
hence, most individuals have a debit card. According to a Roy Morgan Research e-mail, 
16  September 2008, around 91 per cent of individuals hold a debit card of some sort, 
compared to 53 per cent who hold a credit or charge card. 
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where j is the individual consumer and there is a set of N independent demographic 
variables, X, for each consumer. We use a probit model to estimate the probability 
of holding a credit card: 
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  (2) 
where     is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
Aside from demographic variables, we also considered the value of total weekly 
transactions as an explanatory variable for the probability of holding a credit card. 
We might expect that a consumer with relatively high expenditure would be more 
likely to hold a credit card. As the bivariate analysis showed, credit cards are used 
for all but very low-value transactions, and a consumer that makes either 
high-value or a large number of transactions may prefer to have a choice of card 
payment instruments rather than carrying cash. However, it may be equally likely 
that holding a credit card affects the weekly spending of consumers, either 
increasing it because they have the ability to borrow for an interest-free period and 
may make purchases earlier than otherwise, or decreasing it because they are 
paying interest on credit card debt and so have to reduce consumption.15 This 
potential reverse causation means that the value of total weekly transactions may 
be endogenous, and its inclusion in Equation (2) could bias our estimates. 
We attempted to control for this potential endogeneity using an instrumental 
variables approach. Unfortunately, our dataset does not contain a wide range of 
variables that both explain the total value of weekly transactions and are 
independent of factors affecting the decision to hold a credit card. The instrumental 
variables method did not produce meaningful results because the potential 
instrumental variables were only weakly correlated with the value of total weekly 
transactions. For this reason, our preferred approach is to exclude the endogenous 
                                           
15 Access to a credit card cannot affect the long-run level of consumption – it merely allows 
some inter-temporal smoothing of consumption expenditure. In the long run, income will 
determine consumption, but our sample may include people at differing points in this inter-
temporal smoothing cycle, leading to some temporary effect. 
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explanatory variable and estimate the probit model for credit card holding using 
only demographic explanatory variables.16  
5.1.2  Loyalty program credit card holding 
Given our focus on price incentives, we are also interested in determining the 
characteristics of credit card holders that have a loyalty program attached to one of 
their cards. Therefore, for our sample of credit card holders, we estimate the 
following model: 
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 (3) 
where LPhold is defined as 1 if the consumer holds a loyalty program credit card 
and 0 otherwise. As with credit card holding, we estimate a model that only 
includes demographic variables. Again, we considered whether the value of 
weekly credit card transactions might influence the probability of holding a loyalty 
program credit card. However, the value of weekly credit card transactions is 
potentially endogenous and we do not have suitable instruments. 
5.1.3  Credit card, debit card and cash use 
Once we establish the characteristics of consumers holding a credit card, as well as 
credit card holders that have a loyalty program, we turn to the main focus of our 
paper: whether there is a relationship between price incentives on credit cards and 
broader consumer payment instrument use. To do this we follow 
Borzekowski et al  (2008) and use our transaction-level data (pooling all 
transactions of all consumers) to estimate separate probit models for the use of  
 
 
16 Klee (2006) and Borzekowski et al (2008) also estimate payment instrument holding on a set 
of demographic variables alone. 
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credit cards, debit cards and cash.17 Hence, for each payment instrument, the 
probability of use is modelled as: 
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where the dependent variable, Use, takes the value of 1 if the consumer used the 
payment instrument for a particular transaction – either credit card, debit card or 
cash – and 0 otherwise; i  denotes an individual transaction, so Xi  is a set of 
demographic variables specific to each transaction; there is a set of M transaction-
related variables, T; LP indicates whether the consumer participated in a loyalty 
program or not; and I indicates whether the consumer regularly pays off their 
monthly credit card bill or not (that is, whether they are a transactor or a revolver). 
The standard errors have been adjusted to account for the fact that the observations 
are only independent across, rather than within, consumers. 
We base these regressions only on those individuals who hold a credit card. This 
approach is consistent with that applied in previous studies; as Ching and 
Hayashi (2008) note, the focus is on the differences in payment methods between 
those who participate in a loyalty program and those who do not, rather than 
between credit card and non-credit card holders.18  
Ching and Hayashi argue that it is possible that the loyalty program variable is 
endogenous (at least within the context of their dataset). They suggest three 
reasons why the loyalty program dummy variable may be positively correlated 
with unobserved consumer preferences for credit cards: consumers may choose 
loyalty programs because they use credit cards more, owing to a high preference 
 
17  Because this problem can also be treated as one where the consumer has a number of 
alternative payment options that are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, we could also use a 
multinomial logit model, similar to Bounie and François (2006). Our preliminary results from 
a multinomial logit model suggested similar effects in both sign and magnitude to those found 
for the less complex probit models. 
18  Also see Bounie and François (2006), Borzekowski et al (2008) and Zinman (2008). This 
focus on the sub-sample of credit card holders is one reason we do not model the two stages 
of credit card holding and credit card use in the Heckman selection framework. Kohler and 
Rossiter (2005) provide more detail on other reasons for preferring a two-part model over a 
selection model.  
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for credit cards; the incentive of loyalty programs may induce consumers to use the 
credit card more often, thus the consumer learns the good features of the credit 
card and views the card more favourably; and card issuers may send pre-approved 
loyalty program invitations to consumers who have been heavily using credit 
cards. Their assumption is that there are some unobserved preferences for credit 
cards that are reflected in loyalty program membership; without controlling for 
these preferences, they argue the loyalty program dummy variable cannot 
disentangle the general preference for credit cards from the price effects of loyalty 
programs. 
We consider the possibility that our estimate for the effect of loyalty programs may 
be affected by the considerations advanced by Ching and Hayashi (2008). We 
conclude, however, that differences in the nature of the data we use and 
institutional differences between the US and Australia mean that there is unlikely 
to be a meaningful endogeneity problem with the loyalty program variable in our 
regressions.19 
Our general premise is that, once the consumer has chosen to hold a credit card20 
(dependent on preferences such as speed and safety), the predominant remaining 
reason they chose to join a loyalty program is whether there is a net benefit for 
them to do so; that is, whether they will use the credit card sufficiently to 
accumulate rewards that outweigh the higher annual fee generally associated with 
loyalty program credit cards. Loyalty programs do not affect the transactional 
convenience or other similar attributes of a credit card; thus, conditional on 
consumers choosing to hold a credit card, the separate decision to enrol in a loyalty 
                                           
19  In addition to the discussion below, we apply the two-step Rivers and Vuong (1988) 
endogeneity test on the transaction-level data. This test finds that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that loyalty program holding is exogenous. There are, however, some issues with 
applying this test in our particular model set-up; because we have a mix of both transaction-
level and consumer-level data, adjustments for clustering on consumer-level variables need to 
be considered. Given that these adjustments are not established for this test, we do not 
emphasise these results here. Further, our first-stage regression for holding a credit card with 
a loyalty program does not have particularly high explanatory power. Notwithstanding these 
concerns, we consider the results to provide some independent grounds to proceed with our 
assumption that the loyalty program variable is exogeneous within the context of our model 
and dataset. 
20 As mentioned above, our question of interest requires us to restrict our sample to credit card 
holders. Therefore, any potential bias from credit card holding on credit card use has been 
eliminated. 
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program is, we argue, a reflection of a price effect and is precisely the effect we 
want to capture with our loyalty program variable.  
A particular reason for the difference in conclusions is that we have transaction-
level data rather than a single observation of the most frequently used payment 
instrument for each consumer. While it is plausible that a consumer’s most 
frequently used payment method could influence their loyalty program 
membership within a consumer-level dataset where the observations are not well 
anchored in time, we think this concern is significantly reduced with transaction-
level data. We do not expect that the consumer’s use of a credit card for a 
particular transaction could have any effect on their enrolment in a loyalty 
program. We therefore suggest that the causation is only one-way – that loyalty 
program holding has an effect on credit card use but the use of a credit card for a 
given transaction does not affect a consumer’s loyalty program membership over 
the two-week period of our sample. 
In a similar vein, we also suggest that while a loyalty program may increase the 
use of a credit card – the effect we are trying to measure – it is unlikely that having 
a loyalty program will change the consumer’s perceptions of the non-price features 
of credit cards (the second endogeneity concern, as raised by Ching and 
Hayashi 2008). One could argue that these features would be apparent to credit 
card holders regardless of whether they hold a loyalty program or not – particularly 
if many of those features are shared with other card-based payment methods to 
which people have access. These features should already be apparent given that 
credit cards are a mature and widely accepted payment instrument in the Australian 
payments system. 
Finally, reflecting on Ching and Hayashi’s third endogeneity concern, credit card 
use for a particular transaction in our two-week sample could not reasonably be 
expected to lead consumers to sign up for, or receive, loyalty program offers within 
our sample. A reason for this strong conclusion is the significant institutional 
differences between the Australian and US credit card markets. In particular, third-
party credit card providers in Australia do not have access to the ‘positive’ credit 
reporting data that are used in the US to make credit card offers. Hence, Australian 
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providers could not, in fact, make loyalty program offerings to high credit card 
users because they are unaware of who those users are.21 
For these reasons, we conclude that loyalty program participation can be treated as 
a predetermined and exogenous variable in our regressions for payment instrument 
use. 
5.2  Influences on the Probability of Credit Card Holding 
The results from our model of credit card holding are presented in Table 4. The 
coefficients in the second column allow us to gauge only the direction of the 
variable’s effect. Hence, in the last column we also report the marginal effect on 
the implied probabilities of a change in each of the independent variables, 
evaluated at the base case.22 While some variables are surveyed in continuous 
form we converted these into dummy variables to be consistent across all our 
variables. Hence for all variables, the partial effect measures the estimated change 
in the probability of interest following a discrete change in the dummy from 0 to 1. 
The model is parsimonious to the extent that variable categories were excluded 
when the variables in the category were found to be jointly insignificant.23 
                                          
As shown in Table 4, we find that income has a large effect on the probability of 
holding a credit card, but it is only significant for lower income categories. We 
find that relative to a base income of $40  000–$59  999, the probability of a 
consumer with an annual income of between $20 000–$39 999 holding a credit 
card is 17 percentage points lower. This effect is even larger for those on an 
income of less than $20  000, at around 34  percentage points. The finding that 
low-income earners are less likely to hold a credit card is not surprising; however, 
what is interesting is that there is no statistically significant difference between 
 
21 An additional facet of our data is that the loyalty program membership variable is recorded at 
a date prior to the survey rather than after the survey, so our variable is predetermined. 
22  As most of our explanatory variables are multiple-category dummy variables, it is more 
appropriate to evaluate the marginal effects at the base case, rather than at sample means. Our 
base case for each dummy variable category was generally chosen as the category with the 
highest proportion of the sample. An exception to this in the regression for credit card holding 
was personal income for which we chose a base case of $40 000 to $59 999 to reflect the 
average income of a person with (or currently completing) a university degree. 
23  We additionally required that all the excluded dummy variable categories were jointly 
insignificant. 
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incomes of $40 000 and higher. This suggests that the effect at lower income levels 
could reflect supply-side factors, for example the need to satisfy a certain 
eligibility criteria to obtain a credit card. 
The regional (capital city or not capital city) variable has a significant and negative 
effect; compared to the ‘base case’ consumer living in a capital city, a person 
living in a regional location is 12 percentage points less likely to hold a credit card. 
There also appears to be some variation in credit card holding between the various 
states and territories. 
Table 4: Credit Card Holding  
Variable Coefficient  Base  case  Marginal 
effect (ppts) 
Income (<$20 000)  –0.90***  $40 000–$59 999  –34.2 
Income ($20 000–$39 999)  –0.46**  $40 000–$59 999  –16.7 
Income ($60 000–$79 999)  0.15  $40 000–$59 999  4.5 
Income ($80 000–$99 999)  0.23  $40 000–$59 999  6.8 
Income ($100 000–$119 999)  –0.29  $40 000–$59 999  –10.2 
Income ($120 000+)  0.80  $40 000–$59 999  18.5 
Scheme debit card  –0.37***  No scheme debit card  –13.2 
Cheque book  0.41***  No cheque book  11.5 
QLD 0.34**  NSW/ACT  9.8 
VIC 0.10  NSW/ACT  3.1 
TAS 0.13  NSW/ACT  3.9 
SA/NT –0.22  NSW/ACT  –7.7 
WA 0.18  NSW/ACT  5.6 
Regional location  –0.34***  Capital city location  –11.9 
Education (< Year 10)  –0.36**  University  –12.9 
Education (Year 10/11)  –0.11  University  –3.8 
Education (Year 12)  –0.52**  University  –19.0 
Education (Technical qualification) 0.07  University  2.2 
Constant 0.64***     
Number of observations = 579 
Pseudo R
2 = 0.16 
Notes:  ***, ** and * denote the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels of significance respectively. Marginal effects are
evaluated at the base case. 
 
The level of education of the consumer is significant. For example, a consumer 
whose highest educational qualification is less than Grade 10 is 13 percentage 
points less likely to hold a credit card than a consumer with a university 
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qualification. This is consistent with Borzekowski et al’s (2008) finding that higher 
levels of education tend to increase the probability of debit card holding. What this 
tends to suggest is that additional education may increase the probability of 
holding payment instruments aside from the more traditional methods, such as 
cash.24 
It is perhaps not surprising to find that a consumer who holds a scheme debit card 
is around 13 percentage points less likely to hold a credit card than a consumer 
without a scheme debit card. For these consumers, the ‘scheme’ card is likely to be 
a reasonable substitute for a credit card, including for payments that are not 
face-to-face, such as internet payments. 
In contrast, we find that if the consumer holds a cheque book then they are around 
11 percentage points more likely to hold a credit card. While these two payment 
instruments are used for quite different types of payments, one similar feature is 
that they may assist with the consumer’s personal accounting, because both 
provide a means to record the details of expenditures.  
5.3  Influences on the Probability of Loyalty Program Credit Card Holding 
Having established the characteristics of consumers who hold a credit card, an 
additional interest is to ascertain the characteristics of those consumers who hold a 
credit card with a loyalty program. The results from our parsimonious model of 
participation in loyalty programs are presented in Table 5.  
While the results above suggested that consumers with lower levels of income are 
less likely to hold a credit card, we find that lower-income households that do hold 
a credit card are less likely to hold one with a loyalty program attached. This 
suggests that these lower-income consumers may be more likely to hold a credit 
card with lower annual fees and possibly lower interest rates, particularly if they 
are uncertain as to whether they will always be able to pay off their monthly credit 
card bill. This is also likely a reflection of their expected value from a loyalty 
program – with low income levels likely to also have low spending levels, meaning 
that the benefit they receive from the loyalty program may not offset the annual 
membership fee. We also find some tentative evidence that higher-income 
                                           
24 In their sample, only around 52 per cent of households held a debit card. 
 27 
consumers may be more likely to hold a credit card with a loyalty program than the 
base case consumer with an income of between $40  000 to $59  999. 
Higher-income consumers may be more certain of their ability to pay off their 
credit card balance; hence, a loyalty program, as opposed to lower annual fees and 
interest rates, may be a more attractive credit card product. 
Table 5: Loyalty Program Membership Among Credit Card Holders 
Variable Coefficient  Base  case  Marginal 
effect (ppts) 
Income (<$20 000)  –0.87***  $40 000–$59 999  –32.3 
Income ($20 000–$39 999)  –0.28  $40 000–$59 999  –11.3 
Income ($60 000–$79 999)  0.30  $40 000–$59 999  11.5 
Income ($80 000–$99 999)  0.90**  $40 000–$59 999  29.5 
Income ($100 000–$119 999)  0.55  $40 000–$59 999  20.0 
Income ($120 000+)  0.73  $40 000–$59 999  25.1 
Regional location  0.37**  Capital city location  14.1 
Part-time work  0.64**  Full-time work  22.7 
Looking for work  0.88  Full-time work  29.0 
Not looking for work  0.49  Full-time work  18.0 
Retired 0.62**  Full-time  work  22.2 
Education (< Year 10)  0.14  University  5.6 
Education (Year 10/11)  –0.22  University  –8.9 
Education (Year 12)  –0.23  University  –9.3 
Education (Technical qualification) 0.40*  University  14.8 
Constant 0.14     
Number of observations = 299 
Pseudo R
2 = 0.10 
Notes:  ***, ** and * denote the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels of significance respectively. Marginal effects are 
evaluated at the base case. 
 
Interestingly, we find that part-time workers and retirees are more likely to hold a 
loyalty program credit card than those that work full-time, other things equal. This 
seems somewhat counter-intuitive, though this variable may be also capturing   
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effects of other debt holding that are not included in the model.25 For example, 
compared to retirees, full-time workers are more likely to have other forms of debt, 
such as a mortgage. Hence, given their potential liquidity constraints, full-time 
workers may prefer a lower-rate credit card without a loyalty program to avoid 
high interest charges if they do not pay their credit card bill in full by the due date. 
Despite the fact that consumers who live in regional areas are less likely to hold 
credit cards, those that do are more likely to have a loyalty program attached (than 
credit card holders in capital cities). 
5.4  Influences on the Probability of Credit Card Use 
We use the same set of demographic variables, as well as transaction-related and 
price incentive variables, to determine the main factors affecting payment 
instrument use. Hence, the variable we are interested in explaining is whether the 
consumer used a credit card or not for a particular transaction. For these models we 
include the same set of explanatory variables across the credit card, debit card and 
cash models for comparative purposes. Table 6 presents a summary of the results 
for the probability of credit card use.26 Some explanatory variables have been 
excluded for presentation purposes; the full results are in Appendix B. 
5.4.1  Demographic factors 
Previous research has shown that demographic factors have an important effect on 
the probability of using different payment methods (Bounie and François 2006; 
Klee 2006; Borzekowski et al 2008; Emery et al 2008). In Section 5.2 we found  
 
                                           
25 We do not have any variables on the level or existence of other debt available in our survey. 
There is also evidence to suggest multicollinearity between the employment status and 
revolver variables; the employment status variables are jointly insignificant when revolver is 
also included in the regression. Not surprisingly, a revolver is less likely to hold a loyalty 
program credit card and instead probably hold lower-rate credit cards without reward 
programs attached. 
26  Again, our base case categories have generally been determined as the category with the 
highest proportion of the sample for each set of dummy variables. The exception in these 
regressions is the categories for transaction value. In this case we took the category 
corresponding to the average transaction value ($57, for those that hold a credit card); the 
highest proportion of the sample is accounted for by low-value transactions, that is $0–$10. 
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Table 6: Credit Card Use 
By credit card holders  
Variable Coefficient  Base  case  Marginal 
effect (ppts)
No loyalty program  –0.65***  Loyalty program  –22.9 
Revolver –0.43***  Transactor  –15.9 
Male 0.27**  Female  10.9 
Scheme debit card  –0.37***  No scheme debit card  –14.1 
Transaction ($0–$10)  –1.64***  Transaction ($51–$60)  –41.0 
Transaction ($11–$20)  –0.70***  Transaction ($51–$60)  –24.6 
Transaction ($21–$30)  –0.23***  Transaction ($51–$60)  –9.1 
Transaction ($31–$40)  –0.05  Transaction ($51–$60)  –2.1 
Transaction ($41–$50)  –0.08  Transaction ($51–$60)  –3.1 
Transaction ($61–$70)  –0.08  Transaction ($51–$60)  –3.2 
Transaction ($71–$80)  0.11  Transaction ($51–$60)  4.4 
Transaction ($81–$90)  0.09  Transaction ($51–$60)  3.5 
Transaction ($91–$100)  –0.07  Transaction ($51–$60)  –2.7 
Transaction ($101–$110)  0.36**  Transaction ($51–$60)  14.2 
Transaction ($111–$120)  0.45***  Transaction ($51–$60)  17.6 
Transaction ($121–$130)  0.16  Transaction ($51–$60)  6.3 
Transaction ($151–$160)  0.43**  Transaction ($51–$60)  17.1 
Transaction ($161–$170)  –0.07  Transaction ($51–$60)  –2.7 
Transaction ($171–$180)  0.00  Transaction ($51–$60)  0.0 
Transaction ($181–$190)  0.63*  Transaction ($51–$60)  24.4 
Transaction ($191–$200)  0.12  Transaction ($51–$60)  4.7 
Transaction ($201+)  0.03  Transaction ($51–$60)  1.0 
Holiday/travel 0.64***  Retailer  24.5 
Health/medical 0.20**  Retailer  7.8 
Petrol 0.09  Retailer  3.7 
Supermarket –0.08  Retailer  –3.3 
Restaurant –0.44***  Retailer  –16.5 
Small food store  –0.51***  Retailer  –18.8 
Professional services  –0.52***  Retailer  –19.1 
Sporting/entertainment –0.66*** Retailer  –23.4 
Pub/bar –0.75***  Retailer  –25.7 
Take-away –0.93***  Retailer  –30.4 
Constant –0.13   
Number of observations = 8 575 
Pseudo R
2 = 0.28 
Notes:  ***, ** and * denote the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels of significance respectively. Marginal effects are
evaluated at the base case. 
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that personal income can help to explain the probability of a consumer holding a 
credit card. However, once a consumer holds a credit card, income does not appear 
to have a statistically significant effect on the probability that the consumer will 
use their credit card for a given transaction. This is not entirely inconsistent with 
other studies; for example, Bounie and François (2006) do not find an intuitive 
income effect in their results for payment instrument use. In contrast, gender does 
not have a statistically significant effect on credit card holding, but it does play a 
role in determining the probability of credit card use, with males 11 percentage 
points more likely to use a credit card for a given transaction than females. 
If the consumer also holds a scheme debit card, we find that the probability that the 
consumer will use a credit card for a given transaction is 14 percentage points 
lower than otherwise. This result provides some confirmation that scheme debit 
cards may be substitutes for certain types of transactions, particularly internet 
transactions. In contrast, despite cheque book holding having a significant effect on 
credit card holding, it does not significantly affect the probability of using a credit 
card. This is consistent with the likelihood that these two types of payment 
instruments are used for quite different types of payments.  
5.4.2  Transaction characteristics  
Our estimated model in Table 6 controls for a range of transaction-related factors 
that could affect credit card use. Low-value transaction amounts are significantly 
less likely to be associated with using a credit card, controlling for all other factors. 
For example, relative to a base case transaction of $51–$60, a consumer is 
41 percentage points less likely to make a transaction with their credit card if the 
value is under $10. For these low transaction values it is more convenient in terms 
of tender time to pay with other payment instruments, particularly cash. Further, 
while this result controls for loyalty program participation, for transaction values 
of this small size, the benefit of rewards would be quite small because they are 
accumulated as a proportion of transaction value. For example, a $10 transaction 
would only accumulate around 6 cents in terms of a shopping voucher. Figure 6 
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shows, for a base case consumer, that as the transaction amount increases, the 
predicted probability of using a credit card tends to increase.27 
Figure 6: Predicted Probability of Credit Card Use 




























































































Note:   The base case consumer is female, lives in NSW/ACT, participates in a loyalty program, is a transactor, 
does not hold a scheme debit card and made the transaction at a retailer. 
Source:   RBA 
We also find that the type of merchant has a significant effect on the probability of 
the consumer using a credit card. Figure 7 shows the predicted probability of a 
base case consumer using a credit card at various merchant types. Our results 
suggest that relative to a purchase at a retail store, such as a department store,  
 
                                           
27  The predicted probabilities shown in Figure 6 are based on a regression with wider 
transaction-value categories at higher transaction levels than in our preferred regression in 
Table 6. While our preferred regression illustrates the same point – that the predicted 
probability of credit use tends to increase with the transaction amount – the estimated effects 
are more variable for higher transaction values where sample sizes in the narrower categories 
are relatively small. 
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Figure 7: Predicted Probability of Credit Card Use 
For the base case consumer – by merchant category 






















Note:   The base case consumer is female, lives in NSW/ACT, participates in a loyalty program, is a transactor, 
does not hold a scheme debit card, and made a transaction between $51 and $60. 
Source:   RBA 
consumers are more likely to use a credit card when booking a holiday or travel 
and paying for health/medical purchases. The effect of holiday purchases may 
partly capture the relative likelihood that these payments are made online, 
compared to other merchant categories; a factor that is not included in these 
regressions because of potential collinearity with the merchant category variables. 
In Australia, because online EFTPOS is not available, credit cards have tended to 
dominate the online payments market. In contrast, there are a range of merchants 
for which the consumer is less likely to use a credit card (relative to the retailer 
base case); the largest effects were found for education/childcare, take-away and 
pub/bar purchases. For education/childcare the results likely reflect a lack of 
merchant acceptance; the survey is likely to include a number of babysitting or 
tutoring payments, and few tuition or textbook payments, because the survey was 
conducted around the middle of the school year. For pubs and take-away stores the 
results may reflect the slow tender time of a credit card transaction; as the 
consumer typically needs to sign for a credit card transaction, they may feel they 
are ‘holding up’ queues in these generally busy merchants. Alternatively, these 
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merchants may not accept credit cards for similar reasons. As the availability of 
personal identification numbers (PINs) becomes more widespread for credit cards 
in Australia, the probability of credit card use at these types of merchants may 
increase. 
5.4.3  Price incentives 
As foreshadowed by both the aggregate time-series data and the bivariate analysis 
of our survey data, price incentives on credit cards appear to play a significant role 
in credit card use. Our model shows a strong relationship between participation in 
a loyalty program and the probability of credit card use. The results indicate that 
the probability of a credit card holder using a credit card to make a payment is 
23 percentage points lower for a base case cardholder that does not participate in a 
loyalty program, than a cardholder that does have a loyalty program. The effect is 
reasonably large given that the predicted probability of our base case person using 
a credit card is 45 per cent. In other words, there is a 45 per cent chance that a 
credit card holder with a loyalty program (who is female, is a transactor and does 
not have a scheme debit card), spending $51–$60 at a retail store will use a credit 
card to make the payment. This falls to a 22 per cent chance if the same cardholder 
does not have a loyalty program.  
The results also suggest that access to an interest-free period on a consumer’s card 
and the probability of credit card use are related. The results suggest that the 
probability of a credit card holder using a credit card decreases by 16 percentage 
points if the base case cardholder does not  usually receive the benefit of the 
interest-free period. This effect is smaller than the 23 percentage point effect found 
for loyalty programs. One reason for this might be that some revolvers may still 
need to use their credit card owing to liquidity constraints, despite having to pay 
interest on these purchases, whereas a transactor that does not have a loyalty 
program does not face such constraints. The results in the next section also suggest 
that there is a qualitative difference between loyalty programs and interest-free 
periods that show up in the substitution patterns implied by the results for debit 
card and cash use. 
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5.5  Credit Card Price Incentives and the Use of Debit Cards and Cash 
Tables 7 and 8 present a summary of the probit regression results for the use of 
debit cards and cash (the full results tables are provided in Appendix B). While the 
tables include the set of significant demographic and transaction-related variables, 
we focus our discussion on the effects of the credit card price incentives on these 
other payment instruments. 
A comparison of Tables 6 to 8 suggests that participation in a loyalty program or 
access to an interest-free period increases credit card use at the expense of using 
debit cards and cash. For debit cards we find that an interest-free period (on a 
credit card) has a significant effect on use but loyalty program participation does 
not. A consumer is 19 percentage points more likely to use their debit card if they 
do not usually pay off their credit card in full and therefore do not have access to 
an interest-free period; this finding is consistent in sign, but larger in magnitude 
than the effect found in Zinman (2008).28 
For the cash regression we find virtually the opposite effect of credit card price 
incentives to those found for the debit card regression.29 Access to a credit card 
interest-free period does not have a statistically significant effect on the probability 
of cash use. Consumers without a loyalty program, however, are 14 percentage 
points more likely to use cash for a particular transaction than another payment 
method. 
 
                                           
28 Zinman estimates a marginal effect of around 17 percentage points for 2004 data and around 
10 percentage points from the pooled 1995-2004 sample, using his preferred control variable 
specification. 
29 This different finding for the debit card and cash regressions is not driven by multicollinearity 
between the revolver and loyalty program variables in the cash regression, although there 
appears to be some interaction between the variables in the debit card regression.  
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Table 7: Debit Card Use 
By credit card holders 
Variable Coefficient  Base  case  Marginal 
effect (ppts) 
No loyalty program  0.14  Loyalty program  4.0 
Revolver 0.58***  Transactor  18.9 
Income (<$20 000)  –0.36***  $40 000–$59 999  –7.9 
Income ($20 000–$39 999)  –0.05  $40 000–$59 999  –1.4 
Income ($60 000–$79 999)  –0.15  $40 000–$59 999  –3.7 
Income ($80 000–$99 999)  –0.33  $40 000–$59 999  –7.5 
Income ($100 000–$119 999)  –0.74**  $40 000–$59 999  –13.2 
Income ($120 000+)  –0.26  $40 000–$59 999  –6.0 
Transaction ($0–$10)  –1.27***  Transaction ($51–$60)  –16.7 
Transaction ($11–$20)  –0.51***  Transaction ($51–$60)  –10.5 
Transaction ($21–$30)  –0.28***  Transaction ($51–$60)  –6.5 
Transaction ($31–$40)  –0.25**  Transaction ($51–$60)  –5.8 
Transaction ($41–$50)  –0.00  Transaction ($51–$60)  –0.1 
Transaction ($61–$70)  0.10  Transaction ($51–$60)  2.8 
Transaction ($71–$80)  –0.04  Transaction ($51–$60)  –1.1 
Transaction ($81–$90)  0.11  Transaction ($51–$60)  3.0 
Transaction ($101–$110)  –0.13  Transaction ($51–$60)  –3.3 
Transaction ($111–$120)  –0.10  Transaction ($51–$60)  –2.5 
Transaction ($121–$130)  –0.15  Transaction ($51–$60)  –3.6 
Transaction ($151–$160)  –0.29  Transaction ($51–$60)  –6.6 
Transaction ($161–$170)  0.13  Transaction ($51–$60)  3.5 
Transaction ($171–$180)  0.15  Transaction ($51–$60)  4.3 
Transaction ($191–$200)  0.19  Transaction ($51–$60)  5.4 
Transaction ($201+)  –0.20  Transaction ($51–$60)  –4.7 
Holiday/travel –0.29  Retailer  –6.7 
Supermarket 0.26***  Retailer  7.6 
Restaurant –0.62***  Retailer  –11.9 
Small food store  –0.28***  Retailer  –6.5 
Professional services  –0.41**  Retailer  –8.8 
Pub/bar –0.98***  Retailer  –15.3 
Take-away –0.51***  Retailer  –10.4 
Housing/utilities –0.74***  Retailer  –13.3 
Constant –0.91***     
Number of observations = 8 575 
Pseudo R
2 = 0.22 
Notes:  ***, ** and * denote the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels of significance respectively. Marginal effects are 
evaluated at the base case. 
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Table 8: Cash Use 
By credit card holders 
Variable Coefficient  Base  case  Marginal 
effect (ppts)
No loyalty program  0.35***  Loyalty program  13.6 
Revolver –0.08  Transactor  –2.9 
Scheme debit card  –0.14  No scheme debit card  –5.1 
Age (18–29 years)  –0.35**  Age (45–59 years)  –11.7 
Age (30–44 years)  –0.15  Age (45–59 years)  –5.2 
Age (60+ years)  0.23**  Age (45–59 years)  8.8 
Transaction ($0–$10)  1.99***  Transaction ($51–$60)  60.5 
Transaction ($11–$20)  1.03***  Transaction ($51–$60)  39.1 
Transaction ($21–$30)  0.52***  Transaction ($51–$60)  20.4 
Transaction ($31–$40)  0.32***  Transaction ($51–$60)  12.5 
Transaction ($41–$50)  0.13  Transaction ($51–$60)  4.7 
Transaction ($61–$70)  –0.17  Transaction ($51–$60)  –5.9 
Transaction ($71–$80)  –0.08  Transaction ($51–$60)  –3.0 
Transaction ($81–$90)  –0.32**  Transaction ($51–$60)  –10.7 
Transaction ($91–$100)  –0.07  Transaction ($51–$60)  –2.6 
Transaction ($101–$110)  –0.38  Transaction ($51–$60)  –12.5 
Transaction ($111–$120)  –0.41**  Transaction ($51–$60)  –13.3 
Transaction ($121–$130)  –0.02  Transaction ($51–$60)  –0.8 
Transaction ($151–$160)  –0.47*  Transaction ($51–$60)  –15.1 
Transaction ($161–$170)  –0.11  Transaction ($51–$60)  –3.8 
Transaction ($171–$180)  –0.22  Transaction ($51–$60)  –7.6 
Transaction ($181–$190)  –0.56  Transaction ($51–$60)  –17.4 
Transaction ($191–$200)  –0.53*  Transaction ($51–$60)  –16.6 
Transaction ($201+)  –0.32***  Transaction ($51–$60)  –10.7 
Holiday/travel –0.35*  Retailer  –11.7 
Health/medical –0.22**  Retailer  –7.6 
Petrol –0.30***  Retailer  –10.2 
Transport 0.42***  Retailer  16.5 
Restaurant 0.79***  Retailer  30.6 
Small food store  0.60***  Retailer  23.4 
Pub/bar 1.15***  Retailer  42.9 
Take-away 0.91***  Retailer  35.2 
Constant –0.42**     
Number of observations = 8 575 
Pseudo R
2 = 0.38 
Notes:  ***, ** and * denote the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels of significance respectively. Marginal effects are 
evaluated at the base case. 
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It is worth examining why the degree of substitution between credit cards, debit 
cards and cash differs across price incentives and payment instruments. Consider 
first the effect of the interest-free period on the use of the three payment 
instruments. Based on interest costs alone, the price of using a credit card with an 
interest-free period is lower than that of using a debit card, which, in turn, is lower 
than a credit card where interest (at relatively high rates) is payable on a purchase. 
It is therefore logical that a cardholder paying interest might use a debit card rather 
than a credit card.
30 Of more interest is why there is little substitution towards cash 
when the cardholder does not have an interest-free period. Perhaps for transactions 
that a consumer already prefers to perform on a credit card, debit cards are a closer 
substitute.31 Some support for this interpretation comes from the information in 
Section 4 on the use of cash; it is most commonly used for low-value transactions, 
such as take-away meals, while cards are used for larger transactions where speed 
of the transaction is less important.  
The results for the loyalty program variable are somewhat more difficult to 
reconcile. Indeed, the finding that participation in a loyalty program has no 
significant effect on debit card use is somewhat at odds with US studies. For 
example, using a number of similar variables to our model, Ching and 
Hayashi (2006) and Sprenger and Stavins (2008) find fairly clear evidence that if 
the consumer has a loyalty program this increases the probability of credit card use 
and decreases the probability of both debit card and cash/paper-based instrument 
use. Although we suspect our loyalty program effect might not be precisely 
estimated,32 the results could also suggest that consumers have strong preferences 
                                           
30  Ching and Hayashi (2008) find that substitution of debit for credit may not occur at all 
merchants. For example, access to an interest-free period was not found to have a significant 
effect on the choice of payment instrument at department and discount stores. They suggest 
that this may be because consumers ‘… borrow from their future incomes when purchasing 
items that are relatively more expensive’ (p 21). 
31  To test whether the presence of a loyalty program has a different effect across transaction 
values for credit cards, debit cards and cash, we estimated models, using wider transaction-
value categories, including variables of the interaction of each transaction value dummy 
variable with the loyalty program dummy variable. The results are somewhat suggestive of 
the substitution effects described, although a more detailed analysis is an issue for further 
work. 
32  The effect of loyalty program is not particularly robust to various debit card model 
specifications. As mentioned above in Footnote 29, we suspect there are potential effects of 
multicollinearity.  
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about the type of purchases made on debit cards and credit cards. For example, 
whether or not the purchase is made in a supermarket has a statistically significant 
effect on debit card use, which, as discussed in Section 4, may reflect factors such 
as the availability of EFTPOS cash-out at these merchants. Such factors apparently 
outweigh the benefit of earning reward points if the same purchase is made on a 
credit card. 
Our results do, however, show substitution from cash to credit cards if the 
cardholder has a loyalty program. This can also be seen quite clearly in our raw 
data on the use of payment instruments across transaction values. For credit card 
holders without a loyalty program, cash is the most frequently used payment 
method for transaction values up to around $60, whereas for cardholders with a 
loyalty program, cash is only dominant for transactions up to around $30 
(Figure 8). At higher transaction values, the presence of a loyalty program also 
appears to increase the use of credit cards. 
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Figure 8: Share of Payments – Number 
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5.6  Implications of Results for Aggregate Payment Patterns 
The results above provide some interesting insights into what factors drive 
consumers’ choices about payment instruments. The results may also be able to 
give us some insight into broader policy issues, particularly in light of the Bank’s 
reforms, which have affected the price signals facing consumers. In this section, 
 40 
we present a few hypothetical calculations to provide a sense of the aggregate 
economic significance of these modelling results. 33  
If, for some reason, loyalty programs had been removed from all credit cards in 
2008, the above results suggest that the total value of credit card spending in 2008 
would have been around 20 per cent lower.34 Or, put another way, the total value 
of credit card payments in 2008 would have been around $163 billion rather than 
the observed $204 billion. Naturally, a change in loyalty programs would not occur 
in isolation and there would undoubtedly have been other changes occurring if this 
had happened. Hence, this estimate is best used to judge the economic significance 
of our parameter estimates rather than as a prediction of what might occur if 
loyalty programs were removed. 
Nonetheless, the scenario still provides a basis for considering some developments 
that have occurred in the market for credit cards since the reforms. One of these 
has been a reduction in the value of rewards of around 0.2 percentage points of the 
amount spent (from around 0.8 percentage points in 2003).35 Another development 
has been an emergence of low-interest rate credit cards generally without loyalty 
                                           
33 Ching and Hayashi (2008) conduct a similar policy experiment; however, their conclusions 
focus on the change in total card payment instruments (debit and credit), rather than just the 
change in credit card use. 
34 For this hypothetical scenario we assume that if there were no loyalty programs there would 
be a shift from the use of credit cards to cash in line with our regression results. We do not 
consider the proportion of credit card transactions that may shift to an instrument other than 
cash; that is, our regression results suggest that if the consumer does not have a loyalty 
program, they are 23 percentage points less likely to use a credit card for a particular 
transaction, but 13.6 percentage points more likely to use cash for a particular transaction.  
  Specifically, we use the diary study and retail payment statistics collected by the Reserve 
Bank to estimate the number of cash payments in 2008 at around 7.7 billion, representing 
58 per cent of the share of total payments. Data from the diary study over our estimation 
sample suggest that 85 per cent of credit card transactions are made by consumers with a 
loyalty program. Hence, if loyalty programs had been removed, the share of cash transactions 
would have increased by 13.6 percentage points on the 85 per cent of credit card transactions 
made by consumers with a loyalty program. This would have increased the overall cash share 
of total transactions to 69 per cent. This implies a hypothetical number of cash transactions of 
9.3 billion – an increase of 1.6 billion. Multiplying this by the average cash transaction of 
around $26 implies an increase of $41 billion in cash payments. Subtracting this $41 billion 
from the actual value of credit card payments in 2008 implies a decrease of 20 per cent.  
35  Sourced from bank websites for the following cards: ANZ Telstra Rewards Visa card; 
Commonwealth Bank MasterCard Awards card; National Australia Bank Visa Gold card; and 
Westpac Altitude MasterCard. 
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programs, though still with an interest-free period. These cards are aimed at 
revolver consumers, who represent around 34 per cent of credit card holders.36 
Over the past five years there has been a reduction in the accumulation of reward 
points from these two sources. The results from our hypothetical scenario suggest 
that the combination of such changes may be large enough to at least partly explain 
the observed fall in the growth of credit card use since the beginning of the 
reforms. 
We can apply a similar hypothetical calculation to data for the late 1990s to obtain 
a lower-bound sense of the effect of loyalty programs over the past decade or so. 
For this earlier period, our estimates suggest that without loyalty programs, annual 
compound growth between 1994 and 1999 would have been around 12 per cent, 
compared to actual growth of around 20 per cent. As such, the widespread 
introduction of loyalty programs in the second half of the 1990s appears to account 
for some of the rapid growth in credit card use over that period.37 A rough 
interpolation of our 1990s and 2008 calculations also suggests that without loyalty 
programs for credit cards, debit cards may have been the dominant payment 
instrument on a per capita basis throughout the entire period. 
6.  Conclusion 
Over the past decade, the payments landscape in Australia has undergone 
significant change. This is consistent with the international trend towards a greater 
use of electronic payment instruments. But it is also likely to reflect to some extent 
a series of reforms in Australia which have changed the relative prices consumers 
face when choosing between payment methods. This paper provides estimates of 
how important price incentives are for influencing consumer payment patterns. We 
find that participation in a loyalty program and access to an interest-free period 
both tend to increase credit card use. 
The substitution patterns between credit cards, debit cards and cash found in this 
paper are intriguing. While interest-free periods induce substitution to credit cards 
from debit cards, loyalty programs induce substitution from cash. We find that for 
                                           
36 According to the diary study data. 
37 RBA and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2000). 
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a base case consumer, with average characteristics, loyalty programs increase the 
probability of credit card use by 23 percentage points and reduce the probability of 
cash use by 14 percentage points. Debit card use is relatively unaffected by 
whether or not a consumer has a loyalty program. A revolver consumer is around 
19 percentage points more likely to use their debit card (and 16 percentage points 
less likely to use their credit card) for a transaction than a transactor consumer.  
Where there is no financial cost to accessing the line of credit because there is an 
interest-free period, consumers tend to use a credit card instead of a debit card; 
where there is a cost, in the form of interest charges, consumers are more likely to 
use a debit card. These estimates suggest that, even though in certain 
circumstances a revolver may need to use credit and cannot substitute to a debit 
card due to lack of funds, in many cases the two instruments would seem to have a 
reasonable degree of substitutability. The interest-free period, however, has little 
significant effect on cash use, possibly because cash tends to be most commonly 
used for small-value transactions. Nonetheless, consumer preferences between 
cash and credit cards appear to be significantly affected by relatively minor price 
changes, such as those provided by loyalty programs. For the probability of debit 
card use though, we find that the loyalty program price incentive has little effect. 
We also find that the magnitude of these results can help to explain aggregate 
trends. The estimates suggest that the introduction of loyalty programs can account 
for at least some of the rapid growth in credit card use observed in the second half 
of the 1990s. Even with our conservative assumptions, the results suggest that 
debit cards would have remained the dominant payment instrument over the past 
decade in the absence of the price effects from loyalty programs. 
Regardless of the precise numerical effect, the results of this paper suggest that 
price incentives, and loyalty programs in particular, can be influential when it 
comes to consumer decisions about which payment instrument to use. Therefore, it 
seems reasonable to attribute at least part of the changes in payment patterns over 
recent years to the changed price incentives consumers face as a result of the 
Reserve Bank reforms.  
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Appendix A: Diary Study Fields 
Table A1: Fields in the Diary Survey 
 Payments
(a) Cash  withdrawals 
Date Yes  Yes 
Transaction amount  Yes  Yes 
Method  One of the following methods:  One of the following methods:
  1. Cash  1. ATM 
  2. Debit card using a PIN  2. EFTPOS cash-out 
  3. MasterCard/Visa debit card  3. Over-the-counter 
  4. MasterCard/Visa credit card  4. Other 
  5. American Express/Diners Club card   
  6. Petrol/store card   
 7.  Personal  cheque   
 8.  BPAY   
 9.  Other   
Channel  One of the following channels:  Not applicable 
  1. In person   
 2.  Phone   
 3.  Internet   
 4.  Mail   
Merchant type  One of the following merchant types:  Not applicable 
 A  –  Supermarket   
 B  –  Liquor  store   
  C  –  Small food store   
 E  –  Other  retailer   
  F  –  Petrol/fuel for motor vehicles   
 G  –  Transport   
 H  –  Take-away/fast-food   
 J  –  Restaurant/formal  dining   
 K  –  Pub/bar   
  L  –  Sporting and entertainment (leisure)   
  M –  Holiday travel/hotel accommodation   
 N  –  Insurance   
 P  –  Health/medical  care   
 R  –  Housing/utilities   
 S  –  Education/childcare   
  U  –  Professional service/home repair/home 
   improvements 
 
 Z  –  Other   
Surcharge paid  Yes  Not applicable 
Special trip  Not applicable  Yes/No 
(a)   Participants were asked to report payments of bills as payments but were asked not to include any repayments 
of loans such as credit card repayments or mortgage instalments. Participants were asked to record only
personal payments and exclude ‘business’ payments such as those made on behalf of an employer. 
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Appendix B: Results Tables – Use of Payment Methods 
Table B1: Credit Card Use 
By credit card holders (continued next page) 
Variable  Coefficient  Base case  Marginal  
effect (ppts) 
No loyalty program  –0.65***  Loyalty program  –22.9 
Revolver –0.43***  Transactor  –15.9 
Male 0.27**  Female  10.9 
Scheme debit card  –0.37***  No scheme debit card  –14.1 
Cheque book   0.00  No cheque book  0.0 
Age (18–29 years)  0.27  Age (45–59 years)  10.7 
Age (30–44 years)  0.10  Age (45–59 years)  3.9 
Age (60+ years)  –0.01  Age (45–59 years)  –0.6 
Transaction ($0–$10)  –1.64***  Transaction ($51–$60)  –41.0 
Transaction ($11–$20)  –0.70***  Transaction ($51–$60)  –24.6 
Transaction ($21–$30)  –0.23***  Transaction ($51–$60)  –9.1 
Transaction ($31–$40)  –0.05  Transaction ($51–$60)  –2.1 
Transaction ($41–$50)  –0.08  Transaction ($51–$60)  –3.1 
Transaction ($61–$70)  –0.08  Transaction ($51–$60)  –3.2 
Transaction ($71–$80)  0.11  Transaction ($51–$60)  4.4 
Transaction ($81–$90)  0.09  Transaction ($51–$60)  3.5 
Transaction ($91–$100)  –0.07  Transaction ($51–$60)  –2.7 
Transaction ($101–$110)  0.36**  Transaction ($51–$60)  14.2 
Transaction ($111–$120)  0.45***  Transaction ($51–$60)  17.6 
Transaction ($121–$130)  0.16  Transaction ($51–$60)  6.3 
Transaction ($131–$140)  –0.12  Transaction ($51–$60)  –4.7 
Transaction ($141–$150)  –0.03  Transaction ($51–$60)  –1.1 
Transaction ($151–$160)  0.43**  Transaction ($51–$60)  17.1 
Transaction ($161–$170)  –0.07  Transaction ($51–$60)  –2.7 
Transaction ($171–$180)  0.00  Transaction ($51–$60)  0.0 
Transaction ($181–$190)  0.63*  Transaction ($51–$60)  24.4 
Transaction ($191–$200)  0.12  Transaction ($51–$60)  4.7 
Transaction ($201+)  0.03  Transaction ($51–$60)  1.0 
Holiday/travel 0.64***  Retailer  24.5 
Health/medical 0.20**  Retailer  7.8 
Insurance 0.17  Retailer  6.8 
Petrol 0.09  Retailer  3.7 
Liquor store  0.07  Retailer  2.8 
Supermarket –0.08  Retailer  –3.3 
Transport –0.25**  Retailer  –9.6 
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Table B1: Credit Card Use 
By credit card holders (continued) 
Variable  Coefficient  Base case  Marginal  
effect (ppts) 
Housing/utilities –0.21  Retailer  –8.3 
Restaurant –0.44***  Retailer  –16.5 
Other –0.46***  Retailer  –17.0 
Small food store  –0.51***  Retailer  –18.8 
Professional services  –0.52***  Retailer  –19.1 
Sporting/entertainment –0.66***  Retailer  –23.4 
Pub/bar –0.75***  Retailer  –25.7 
Take-away –0.93***  Retailer  –30.4 
Education/childcare –0.96***  Retailer  –31.0 
Income (<$20 000)  0.24  $40 000–$59 999  9.6 
Income ($20 000–$39 999)  –0.18  $40 000–$59 999  –7.1 
Income ($60 000–$79 999)  0.06  $40 000–$59 999  2.2 
Income ($80 000–$99 999)  0.06  $40 000–$59 999  2.3 
Income ($100 000–$119 999)  0.12  $40 000–$59 999  4.7 
Income ($120 000+ )  0.19  $40 000–$59 999  7.7 
QLD 0.01  NSW/ACT  0.4 
VIC 0.04  NSW/ACT  1.4 
TAS 0.27  NSW/ACT  10.8 
SA/NT 0.50**  NSW/ACT  19.4 
WA 0.39**  NSW/ACT  15.6 
Constant –0.13     
Number of observations = 8 575 
Pseudo R
2 = 0.28 
Notes:  ***, ** and * denote the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels of significance respectively. Marginal effects are 
evaluated at the base case. 
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Table B2: Debit Card Use 
By credit card holders (continued next page) 
Variable Coefficient  Base  case  Marginal 
effect (ppts) 
No loyalty program  0.14  Loyalty program  4.0 
Revolver 0.58***  Transactor  18.9 
Male –0.09  Female  –2.2 
Cheque book  0.17*  No cheque book  4.8 
Age (18–29 years)  0.18  Age (45–59 years)  5.2 
Age (30–44 years)  0.05  Age (45–59 years)  1.4 
Age (60+ years)  –0.26*  Age (45–59 years)  –6.1 
Transaction ($0–$10)  –1.27***  Transaction ($51–$60)  –16.7 
Transaction ($11–$20)  –0.51***  Transaction ($51–$60)  –10.5 
Transaction ($21–$30)  –0.28***  Transaction ($51–$60)  –6.5 
Transaction ($31–$40)  –0.25**  Transaction ($51–$60)  –5.8 
Transaction ($41–$50)  –0.00  Transaction ($51–$60)  –0.1 
Transaction ($61–$70)  0.10  Transaction ($51–$60)  2.8 
Transaction ($71–$80)  –0.04  Transaction ($51–$60)  –1.1 
Transaction ($81–$90)  0.11  Transaction ($51–$60)  3.0 
Transaction ($91–$100)  0.00  Transaction ($51–$60)  0.1 
Transaction ($101–$110)  –0.13  Transaction ($51–$60)  –3.3 
Transaction ($111–$120)  –0.10  Transaction ($51–$60)  –2.5 
Transaction ($121–$130)  –0.15  Transaction ($51–$60)  –3.6 
Transaction ($131–$140)  0.39*  Transaction ($51–$60)  12.0 
Transaction ($141–$150)  0.19  Transaction ($51–$60)  5.5 
Transaction ($151–$160)  –0.29  Transaction ($51–$60)  –6.6 
Transaction ($161–$170)  0.13  Transaction ($51–$60)  3.5 
Transaction ($171–$180)  0.15  Transaction ($51–$60)  4.3 
Transaction ($181–$190)  0.06  Transaction ($51–$60)  1.8 
Transaction ($191–$200)  0.19  Transaction ($51–$60)  5.4 
Transaction ($201+)  –0.20  Transaction ($51–$60)  –4.7 
Holiday/travel –0.29  Retailer  –6.7 
Health/medical –0.13  Retailer  –3.2 
Insurance  –0.67** Retailer –12.5 
Petrol 0.16*  Retailer  4.5 
Liquor  store  0.07 Retailer 1.9 
Supermarket 0.26***  Retailer  7.6 
Transport –0.44***  Retailer  –9.3 
Housing/utilities –0.74***  Retailer  –13.3 
Restaurant –0.62***  Retailer  –11.9 
Other –0.63***  Retailer  –12.1 
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Table B2: Debit Card Use 
By credit card holders (continued) 
Variable Coefficient  Base  case  Marginal 
effect (ppts) 
Small food store  –0.28***  Retailer  –6.5 
Professional services  –0.41**  Retailer  –8.8 
Sporting/entertainment –0.78***  Retailer –13.7 
Pub/bar –0.98***  Retailer  –15.3 
Take-away –0.51***  Retailer  –10.4 
Education/childcare –0.91***  Retailer  –14.8 
Income (<$20 000)  –0.36***  $40 000–$59 999  –7.9 
Income ($20 000–$39 999)  –0.05  $40 000–$59 999  –1.4 
Income ($60 000–$79 999)  –0.15  $40 000–$59 999  –3.7 
Income ($80 000–$99 999)  –0.33  $40 000–$59 999  –7.5 
Income ($100 000–$119 999)  –0.74**  $40 000–$59 999  –13.2 
Income ($120 000+ )  –0.26  $40 000–$59 999  –6.0 
QLD 0.27**  NSW/ACT  8.0 
VIC 0.45***  NSW/ACT  14.0 
TAS 0.15  NSW/ACT  4.3 
SA/NT –0.12  NSW/ACT  –3.1 
WA 0.08  NSW/ACT  2.3 
Constant –0.91***     
Number of observations = 8 575 
Pseudo R
2 = 0.22 
Notes:  ***, ** and * denote the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels of significance respectively. Marginal effects are
evaluated at the base case. 
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Table B3: Cash Use 
By credit card holders (continued next page) 
Variable Coefficient  Base  case  Marginal 
effect (ppts)
No loyalty program  0.35***  Loyalty program  13.6 
Revolver –0.08  Transactor  –2.9 
Male –0.11  Female  –3.9 
Scheme debit card  –0.14  No scheme debit card  –5.1 
Cheque book  –0.14  No cheque book  –4.8 
Age (18–29 years)  –0.35**  Age (45–59 years)  –11.7 
Age (30–44 years)  –0.15  Age (45–59 years)  –5.2 
Age (60+ years)  0.23**  Age (45–59 years)  8.8 
Transaction ($0–$10)  1.99***  Transaction ($51–$60)  60.5 
Transaction ($11–$20)  1.03***  Transaction ($51–$60)  39.1 
Transaction ($21–$30)  0.52***  Transaction ($51–$60)  20.4 
Transaction ($31–$40)  0.32***  Transaction ($51–$60)  12.5 
Transaction ($41–$50)  0.13  Transaction ($51–$60)  4.7 
Transaction ($61–$70)  –0.17  Transaction ($51–$60)  –5.9 
Transaction ($71–$80)  –0.08  Transaction ($51–$60)  –3.0 
Transaction ($81–$90)  –0.32**  Transaction ($51–$60)  –10.7 
Transaction ($91–$100)  –0.07  Transaction ($51–$60)  –2.6 
Transaction ($101–$110)  –0.38  Transaction ($51–$60)  –12.5 
Transaction ($111–$120)  –0.41**  Transaction ($51–$60)  –13.3 
Transaction ($121–$130)  –0.02  Transaction ($51–$60)  –0.8 
Transaction ($131–$140)  –0.34  Transaction ($51–$60)  –11.2 
Transaction ($141–$150)  0.06  Transaction ($51–$60)  2.1 
Transaction ($151–$160)  –0.47*  Transaction ($51–$60)  –15.1 
Transaction ($161–$170)  –0.11  Transaction ($51–$60)  –3.8 
Transaction ($171–$180)  –0.22  Transaction ($51–$60)  –7.6 
Transaction ($181–$190)  –0.56  Transaction ($51–$60)  –17.4 
Transaction ($191–$200)  –0.53*  Transaction ($51–$60)  –16.6 
Transaction ($201+)  –0.32***  Transaction ($51–$60)  –10.7 
Holiday/travel –0.35*  Retailer  –11.7 
Health/medical –0.22**  Retailer  –7.6 
Liquor store  –0.10  Retailer  –3.5 
Insurance –0.62*  Retailer  –18.7 
Petrol –0.30***  Retailer  –10.2 
Supermarket –0.02  Retailer  –0.7 
Transport 0.42***  Retailer  16.5 
Housing/utilities –0.32**  Retailer  –10.7 
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Table B3: Cash Use 
By credit card holders (continued) 
Variable Coefficient  Base  case  Marginal 
effect (ppts)
Restaurant 0.79***  Retailer  30.6 
Other 0.14  Retailer  5.1 
Small food store  0.60***  Retailer  23.4 
Professional services  0.27  Retailer  10.4 
Sporting/entertainment 0.92***  Retailer  35.3 
Pub/bar 1.15***  Retailer  42.9 
Take-away 0.91***  Retailer  35.2 
Education/childcare 0.77***  Retailer  30.0 
Income (<$20 000)  –0.01  $40 000–$59 999  –0.5 
Income ($20 000–$39 999)  0.17  $40 000–$59 999  6.6 
Income ($60 000–$79 999)  0.02  $40 000–$59 999  0.7 
Income ($80 000–$99 999)  0.18  $40 000–$59 999  6.9 
Income ($100 000–$119 999)  –0.00  $40 000–$59 999  –0.1 
Income ($120 000+ )  0.01  $40 000–$59 999  0.3 
QLD –0.15  NSW/ACT  –5.2 
VIC –0.30***  NSW/ACT  –10.1 
TAS –0.18  NSW/ACT  –6.3 
SA/NT –0.24  NSW/ACT  –8.2 
WA –0.32**  NSW/ACT  –10.7 
Constant –0.42**     
Number of observations = 8 575 
Pseudo R
2 = 0.38 
Notes:  ***, ** and * denote the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels of significance respectively. Marginal effects are
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